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1 Frequent patent infringement
 disputes
T h e  J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  b e e n  
implementing the Intellectual Property Strategic 
Program since 2003. This program’s underlying 
notion is stated as follows: “In order to increase 
nat iona l  wea lth th rough ef fect ive use of  
intellectual property, it is necessary to promote 
creation of high-quality intellectual property 
in the R&D sector and contents businesses and 
promptly protect it legally, thereby maximizing 
added values in industry” [1]. While the program 
emphasizes creation, protection and exploitation 
of intellectual property, this article focuses on 
exploitation alone.
Since the launch of the Intellectual Property 
Strategic Program, Japanese companies have 
become more aware of the need for protection 
of intellectual property, especially patents. An 
examination of the four Nikkei newspapers has 
revealed that the annual number of articles on 
patent infringement, which had hovered at 100 
until 2003, doubled to 205 in 2004. This suggests 
an increased frequency of patent infringement 
disputes.
Another interesting phenomenon coinciding 
with this is that the number of articles returned 
in a search with the keyword “cross - license” 
doubled from the previous year’s average to 64 in 
2004. For example, in the plasma panel market, 
which is a growing sector of the wide flat-screen 
TV market, Fujitsu filed a patent infringement 
suit against South Korean firm Samsung in April 
2004. Samsung immediately responded with 
a countersuit. But, the two parties reached a 
settlement in June and executed a cross-license 
agreement. In November of the same year, 
Matsushita Electric filed a patent infringement 
suit against LG Electronics of South Korea. 
The Korean firm filed counterclaims against 
Matsushita in South Korea. This dispute was also 
resolved by cross-licensing in April 2005.
Patent infringement suits are filed to protect 
the patent holder’s exclusive right to exploit the 
invention, which is the essence of the patent 
system. However, the parties involved in the 
plasma panel cases did not pursue this right 
and instead sought early settlement through 
cross - licensing. In such industrial sectors as 
electrical, electronics, and information and 
communications technologies, patents are 
often licensed to other companies, rather than 
exclusively exploited by the inventor [2]. In fact, 
many newspaper articles on cross - l icensing 
refer to products in these sectors, including 
steppers (equipment used in semiconductor 
manufacturing), f lash memory, CPUs, optical 
disks, blue LEDs, plasma panels, and digital 
cameras. Why is this?
T h e  J a p a n  F a i r  T r a d e  C o m m i s s i o n  
( JFTC) announced at the end of June 2005 
“Guidelines on Standardization and Patent Pool 
Arrangements” [3]. This document states that 
“standardization of specifications is not assumed 
to pose legal issues with the Anti Monopoly Act” 
unless such activities lead to restricting prices of 
new products, restricting alternative specification 
development, unreasonably extending the scope 
of specifications, or other potential threats to fair 
competition. This raises another question: Why 
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did the JFTC release the guidelines at this time?
2 Tragedy of anticommons
Companies accumulate the results of their 
research and development activities. These results 
can be divided into two types: know-how, which 
is concealed within the company, and research 
papers and patents, which are disclosed to the 
public. In Figure 1, the base area represents 
the “technical field.” In this field, individual 
companies occupy their own territories, and 
papers and patents are like the shell surrounding 
the core territories. Companies create new 
products through research and development 
within their territories. The resulting products 
appear on the top face, which represents the 
“product field.” Each company’s new products 
are assumed to ref lect its own accumulated 
technology.
A company that has provided a product most 
favored by consumers earns a profit. Accumulated 
technology is of no use unless it is valued in the 
marketplace. If a product of Company A succeeds 
in the market,  Company A’s accumulated 
technology is given value. By contrast, Company 
B, the loser, faces three problems. First, it has 
fai led to take advantage of its accumulated 
technolog y.  Second,  i t  needs to conduct  
additional R&D to meet market demands. Third, 
Company B is forced to catch up with Company 
A by developing a product similar to that of A, 
while avoiding using A's patented technology. 
Patent as an exclusive r ight thus protects 
Company A.
While Figure 1 assumes that the R&D area 
of Company A does not overlap with that of 
Company B, this is not realistic. In the real world, 
there are frequent overlaps between individual 
companies’ R&D areas because companies always 
monitor market trends carefully and sometimes 
need to adopt the same technology to ensure 
interoperability between modules for products 
incorporating a lot of modules.
This state is illustrated in Figure 2. In this chart, 
there is some overlap between the know-how 
of Companies A, B and C. This is a result of each 
company having conducted R&D independently 
but having discovered and accumulated the same 
know-how by accident. The three companies 
have individually filed patent applications, which 
have been examined and granted separately. 
These patents take up completely separate areas 
in the technical field because there should be no 
overlap between patent rights. Similarly, since 
every paper must be novel, papers of the three 
companies occupy separate areas in Figure 2.
In such a situation, suppose that a new product 
requires technologies from all three companies. 
If any of the three refuses to license its patented 
technology to the other parties, the entire set of 
accumulated technologies becomes useless. This 
is what is called the “tragedy of anticommons.” It 
occurs when a number of individuals claim rights 
Figure 1 : Relative relationships between companies in
 technical and product fields (schematic diagram)
Source: Prepared by the author
Figure 2 :  Relationships in technical field between three
 companies engaged in similar R&D
 (schematic diagram)
Source: Prepared by the author
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to a single land property and eventually make 
it unavailable. This phenomenon contrasts with 
the “tragedy of commons,” which is an economic 
term that refers to a situation in which the yield 
is reduced as a result of the overuse of common 
land by individuals.
The Japan Patent Office released in March 
2005 a report on the trends in patent applications 
related to plasma panels [4]. The report shows 
that, when grouped by applicant nationality, 
plasma panel patent applications filed to the JPO 
are split between Japan and South Korea. The 
first peak of applications was in 1998 to 1999, 
when Japanese organizations filed some 700 
applications, while South Korean organizations 
filed about 400. The number of applications 
began to increase again in 2002, suggesting that 
“fierce competition will highly likely continue 
between Japanese applicants and their Korean 
counterparts for the present,” according to the 
report. A continued application battle will make it 
increasingly difficult for any company to produce 
new products based only on its own patents.
Japanese mobile phone users are able to watch 
digital TV on their handsets. This is enabled 
by a video coding technology known as H.264, 
which has been standardized as an international 
standard in the ITU-T. When the organization 
began accepting licensing offers from related 
patent holders in its standardization process, it 
received as many as 169 offers.
To produce DVD products, such as players 
and disks, manufacturers need to be granted 
licenses from the owners of essential patents. 
To provide a centralized licensing process for 
DVD manufacturers, a patent pool called the 
DVD 6C Licensing Agency (hereinafter DVD6C) 
has been formed, as described later in “4 Patent 
Pools.” Nine companies participate in this group: 
Toshiba, Hitachi, Matsushita Electric, Mitsubishi 
Electric, Time Warner, Victor, IBM, Sanyo Electric, 
and Sharp. DVD6C licenses 760 patents owned by 
these companies.
In the information and communications sector, 
scores of companies around the world perform 
R&D in similar areas. As a result of equally 
competent researchers pursuing inventions in 
overlapping research areas, patents related to the 
same technology are owned by many different 
companies. However, marketable products 
and services in this sector usually combine a 
multitude of components and subsystems that 
involve multiple patents. This characteristic often 
causes the tragedy of anticommons.
T h e  o n l y  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  t r a g e d y  o f  
anticommons is cross - l icensing the related 
patents. This fact has led companies to deny the 
core concept of the patent system, patents as 
exclusive rights. In this regard, both international 
standardization activities and patent pools are 
attempts to solve the tragedy of anticommons 
through patent licensing.
3 International standardization
 and patents
T he r e  a r e  t wo  t y p e s  o f  i n te r n a t ion a l  
standardization activities: publ ic activities 
supported by governments and voluntary forums 
comprised of private enterprises. The first-type 
activities are typically conducted by ISO, IEC and 
ITU. The second-type or forum activities usually 
involve a group of leading companies that share 
the same interest. Either type of organization 
fol lows a democratic process for def in ing 
standards and releases the results for public use.
T he  i n te r n a t ion a l  s t a nd a rd i z a t ion  fo r  
DVD technology has been promoted by the 
DVD Forum. Wireless LAN standards have 
been discussed by the IEEE 802 Committee. 
International standards for the Internet have 
been developed by the IETF. Table 1 l ists 
standardization forums existing in the global 
information and communications sector. The 
extraordinary length of the list demonstrates how 
vital standardization is in this sector.
Both publ ic and pr ivate standardizat ion 
organizations have their own policies on how 
to deal with patents associated with their 
standards. These policies closely resemble each 
other because they are modeled on the same text 
that was first created in 1985 by the American 
standardizat ion body, ANSI, and has been 
reviewed continuously by the ITU.
The policy essentially consists of the two 
principles described in Table 2. According to 
them, if a patent is found to be essential to a 
standard, its holder is expected to license the 
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patent without discrimination. There is no 
notion of exclusive right. There are more drastic 
examples. Some companies have gone so far as to 
declare through an international standardization 
body that if their proposals are incorporated into 
a standard, they will license all of their related 
patents without discrimination.
The ITU-T, which coordinates standardization 
for telecommunications under the umbrella of the 
ITU, makes available a database of declarations 
by patent holders [5]. As of August 10, 2005, the 
database contained 95 declarations to “grant 
a free license on a non-discriminatory basis” 
and 1308 to “grant a license on reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms and conditions.” On the 
other hand, 26 companies declared that if their 
proposals were incorporated into a standard, 
they would license any of their patents that were 
related to the standard without discrimination.
4 Patent pools
A s ing le i nternat iona l  s t andard can be 
associated with patents owned by several 
different companies. A manufacturer wishing 
to create a product that suppor ts such a 
standard needs to be granted a license from 
each respective owner of the related patents. 
To simplify this process and set a reasonable 
aggregate royalty for a package of relevant 
patents, patent holders sometimes choose to form 
a group called a “patent pool.”
4-1 MPEG-2
A notable example of patent pools is the one 
regarding MPEG-2, a video coding standard. In 
1997, a patent pool for MPEG-2 was formed by 
Columbia University, Fujitsu, General Instrument, 
Lucent Technologies, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, 
Philips, Scientific-Atlanta, and Sony. Under this 
mechanism, relevant patents of these entities 
are pooled through an independent agency that 
was appointed to provide licensing and royalty 
collection services. Collected royalties are shared 
among the patent pool participants.
Before the creation of the MPEG-2 patent pool, 
its members asked the U.S. Federal Government 
to verify that their conduct would not violate the 
federal antitrust laws. The Department of Justice 
responded by issuing a document confirming 
Table 1 : Forums in the information and communications sector
1394TA
ATMF
CDG
DECT Forum
ECHONET
ELC
FIPA
GSM Association
IDB Forum
ISC
JPNIC ENUM
M4IF
MITF
OGC
OSGi
PICMG
SDR
TOG
USBIF
WS-I
ADSL
BCDF
CIDf
DHF
ECOM
EMA
FSAN
H2GF
IDF
ISOC
JICSAP
MBA
MOPASS
OIF
PCCA
POF
SSIPG
TVAnytime Forum
W3C, Web 3D
ZigBee
AIM
Bluetooth
CELF
DHWG
EDIFICE
EMF
GGF
HAVi
IMTC
ITS America
JIF, JIPPA
MCPC
MPLS Forum
OMA
PCISIG
RPRA
STA
UbiqNet
WfMC
AMIC
Cable Modems
CommerceNet
DOPG
EIDX
ENUM, ERTICO
GlobalPlatform
HomePNA
IPv6
ITS Forum
LAP
MEF
MSF
OMG
PCMCIA
Salutation
T-E
UMTS
WiMAX
ASN.1
CBOP
CTFJ
DSLF
EJF
FCIA
GSA
ICANN
IrDA
ITS UK
LONMARK
MeT
OASIS
OSDL
PHS MoU
SCA
TMForum
UpnP
WiMedia
Source: Telecommunication Technology Committee
Table 2 : Typical policy regarding patent handling in international standardization bodies
•  Standardizaiton organization should inquire of its members about ownership of patents related to each draft 
standard, and approve the standard if the patent holders agree to declare their intention to grant “free licenses on a 
non-discriminatory basis” or “licenses on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions.”
•  If any of the patent holders “declares its intention to place any other additional terms and/or conditions,” no standard 
will be established.
Source: Prepared by the author
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that this patent pool would not conflict with 
the antitrust laws as long as it licensed only 
the essential patents on a non-discriminatory 
basis and involved no price - fixing or similar 
agreements. Thus, this form of patent pooling 
was officially approved by the U.S. Department of 
Justice.
4-2 DVD
International standards for DVD technology 
have been establ ished by the DVD Forum. 
DVD6C is a patent pool set up in 1999 for DVD 
patent licensing. DVD6C makes available basic 
information on royalties. For example, a licensee 
of DVD video player patents must pay per product 
unit either 4 percent of the net selling price or 
$3.00, whichever is greater. A licensee of DVD 
disk patents is required to pay $0.045 per disk.
Outside of the patents managed by DVD6C, 
there are other essential DVD patents owned by 
Philips, Pioneer and Sony. These three firms have 
formed their own patent pool called DVD3C. A 
company that intends to enter the DVD market 
needs to seek licenses from both patent pools. 
However, the members of DVD6C and those of 
DVD3C have cross-licensed their patents so that 
both sides can be assured of access to the market.
4-3 Third-generation mobile telephony
Third - generation (3G) mobi le telephone 
standards entail a huge number of patents. A 
report[6] submitted by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications to a task force in 
the Council for Science and Technology Policy 
states that essential patent declarations submitted 
regarding W- CDMA and CDMA2000, the two 
major technologies constituting 3G mobile 
telephony, number 352 and 235, respectively. 
Of the declarations on W-CDMA, 117 are from 
Japan, followed by 102 from the U.S. and 68 from 
Europe.
To license a great many patents related to 
3G mobile communications technology, the 
3G Patent Platform (3G3P) was established in 
2002 as a patent pool. It provides licensing 
services through the subgroups dedicated to 
different technologies, including W-CDMA and 
CDMA2000. However, the 3G3P is not highly 
regarded in the industry because it has failed to 
include Qualcomm, the largest patent holder in 
3G mobile telephony.
4-4 Reluctance to create a patent pool
There have been only a limited number of 
patent pools formed so far. The greatest inhibitor 
is the cost of organizing a patent pool. Decisions 
on which patents are essential require the 
involvement of impartial experts, and such a 
process is inevitably expensive. When expected 
earnings from royalties are unlikely to justify the 
assumed expenses, companies hesitate to create a 
patent pool.
5 Relationships between
 patent pools and
 the Anti-Monopoly Act
The Japan Fair Trade Commission released 
at  the  end of  Ju ne 20 05 “Gu idel i nes  on 
Standardization and Patent Pool Arrangements.” 
No other gu idel ines of any countr y have 
addressed th is i ssue so comprehensively.  
This document states that “standardization 
of specifications is not assumed to pose legal 
issues with respect to the Anti-Monopoly Act,” 
but it also defines that “if a patent holder has 
taken part in the standardization activities and 
is endeavoring to have its patented technologies 
adopted in the specifications, refusing to grant 
a l icense without rational reason af ter the 
specifications have been established and widely 
adopted poses a legal problem with respect to 
the Act.” This can be interpreted as meaning 
that no conf lict with the Act occurs as long 
as patent holders observe the patent policy 
explained in the earlier chapter, “3 International 
Standardization and Patents.”
At the same time, the guidelines present JFTC’s 
perspective on patent pools as follows: “If the 
patents being pooled are only those essential for 
adopting functions and utilities in compliance 
with the specifications, the act of pooling patents 
does not restrict competition among the patented 
technologies, thus posing no problems under the 
Act.” This is the same stance as was taken by the 
U.S. Department of Justice on the case described 
earlier in “4 Patent Pools.”
The JFTC’s guidelines are also noteworthy in 
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that they demonstrate a positive view on patent 
pools, stating: “It does not generally pose legal 
problems under the Act if the parties developing 
specifications decide, in advance, to pool and 
license their patents for the specifications that 
they will obtain, when the patents that will 
be pooled are limited to essential patents and 
there are no other restrictions on their use.” 
This statement is a response from the JFTC to a 
requirement defined in the “Intellectual Property 
Strategic Program 2005[7],” the latest version 
of the series. The Program assigned the task to 
the JFTC, stating: “The formation and operation 
of patent pools are likely to raise the issue of 
violation of the Anti -Monopoly Act. For this 
reason, the Government of Japan will develop 
guidelines under the Anti-Monopoly Act by the 
end of FY2005.” Yet another point to note about 
the guidelines is their user-friendliness, including 
the provision of nine specific examples.
6 Incentives to license patents
Why do companies l icense their patents? 
As explained in the chapter, “2 Tragedy of 
Anticommons,” they cannot do business without 
l icensing. But, this is not the only reason. 
Companies are driven in the short term by the 
hope of reaping economic benefits, and in the 
long term by the strategic value of exerting an 
inf luence on market trends and maintaining 
competitiveness.
6-1 Short-term value of licensing
(1) Expectation of earnings from royalties
Suppose that a product can be produced using 
patented technologies separately owned by 
Companies A, B and C. Company A licenses its 
patented technology to Companies B and C in 
exchange for licenses from them. Royalties that 
the three parties pay to one another are offset by 
the payments they receive. In other words, each 
of the three is using the other two's patented 
technologies, free of charge. This relationship is 
shown in Table 3. 
If a company owns patents, it can exchange 
them with other companies’ patents. In Table 3, 
each party is using three patents by offering one 
patent. The economic value of this is equivalent 
to a three-fold improvement in R&D efficiency.
On the other hand, Company D and others 
without patents must pay a 1% royalty to each 
of the three patent owners. When a company 
tries to produce a product that meets consumer 
demands, such as satisfying the desire for a 
single drive capable of playing DVDs and CDs, it 
needs to adopt additional patented technologies, 
resulting in an increase in royalty payments. 
These payments add to the product cost and 
put the company at a disadvantage in market 
competition.
The royalties from Company D and others are 
divided among Companies A, B and C. The total 
amount can be exceptionally large. For example, 
the aggregate amount of royalties received by 
the DVD6C member companies can be roughly 
estimated as follows: The Japan Electronics and 
Information Technology Industries Association 
reported that the size of the global optical disk 
equipment market was 243.51 million units for 
2004[8]. On the assumption that the market is split 
50/50 between CD and DVD equipment and a 
$3.00 royalty is charged per unit, the DVD patent 
holders could collect as much as ¥40 billion in 
total. Furthermore, the Japan Recording-Media 
Industries Association forecasts that the global 
recordable DVD market will reach 2.4 billion 
disks in 2005[9]. This number multiplied by the 
royalty of $0.045 per disk equals ¥12 billion. The 
sum of the royalties for equipment and disks, ¥52 
billion, is shared among the DVD6C members. 
Each member company could receive something 
in the order of over ¥5 billion.
(2) Ease of establishing patent infringement
Establ i sh ing patent in f r ingement,  f rom 
gathering evidence to paying litigation expenses, 
is usually a very costly process, because the 
Table 3 : Effective royalties required for product sales
 (simplified example)
A B C
A 0% 0% 0%
B 0% 0% 0%
C 0% 0% 0%
D and others with no patents 1% 1% 1%
Receiver
Payer
Source: Prepared by the author
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suspected party always denies the allegation. 
However,  th i s  i s  not  the case with DV D 
technology. Companies selling products that 
comply with the international DVD standards 
cannot deny their use of patented technologies 
and therefore have no other choice but to pay 
royalties. This way, the owners of the patents 
essentia l to adoption of the standard can 
efficiently earn enormous amounts of money 
without waiting for the outcome of infringement 
litigation.
6-2 Strategic value of licensing
(1) Compatibility/interoperability and
 network externality
A common characteristic of MPEG -2, DVD 
and 3G mobile communications technologies is 
the importance of ensuring compatibility and 
interoperability between hardware products 
and between hardware and software. This also 
applies to such technologies as wireless LAN and 
the Internet.
A technolog y i s  wor th less  i f  ha rdware 
a nd  so f t wa re  produc t s  i ncor por a t i ng  i t  
cannot communicate with one another for 
interoperation. Since no single company can 
provide al l related hardware and sof tware 
exclusively, the only choice for companies is to 
take steps to develop commonly shared technical 
specifications with others. This is the primary 
reason that international standardization is so 
vigorously pursued in such sectors as electrical, 
electronics, and information and communications 
technologies.
Ensured compatibility expands the market. 
The DVD market could not have grown so large 
if the compatible media had varied from player 
to player. Likewise, the wireless LAN market 
continues to expand despite the existence 
of different standards: 802.11a, 11b and 11g. 
Consumers do not have to worry about choosing 
a particular standard when purchasing a wireless 
LAN product, because all hardware is designed 
to support all three standards by automatically 
switching from one to another.
When the user benefit increases nonlinearly 
with growth in the number of available hardware 
and software products, the phenomenon can be 
described as having “network externality.” Patent 
holders are forced to make a choice between 
two options. The first option is using the patent 
exclusively but restricting market growth; the 
second is licensing the patent to other companies 
in the hope of benefiting from market expansion 
based on network external ity. Most patent 
holders choose the second option.
(2) Weakening competitors’ motivation
 for R&D
As described in “2 Tragedy of Anticommons,” 
i f Company A’s technology, which is highly 
valued in the market, is patented, Company B as 
a follower must avoid that patented technology. 
However, Company B sti l l has a chance of 
challenging Company A’s dominance by creating 
a more attractive product through R&D in a 
different direction. Taking account of such a 
possibility, Company A should adopt a strategy 
for minimizing the risk of losing its current 
dominance and maintaining market leadership 
over the long term.
One way for Company A to weaken Company 
B’s motivation for R&D is to promise to license 
the patented technologies. This can relieve 
Company B of the need to develop alternative 
technologies. Once such a par tnersh ip is 
established, Company A can always be the first to 
introduce a new product onto the market, while 
having Company B follow suit after a given delay. 
If this situation continues, Company B becomes a 
“good follower” for Company A.
American companies, such as IBM, Cisco 
Systems and Microsoft, have expressed their 
willingness to grant their licenses to others on a 
non-discriminatory basis. In particular, Microsoft 
has begun entering into cross-license agreements 
with many Japanese firms. These trends can be 
regarded as strategies for creating good followers.
Simi lar strategies have been adopted by 
Japanese companies. The DVD6C and DVD3C 
members, most of which are Japanese, signed 
license agreements with Chinese DVD player 
manufacturers in 2002. This can be seen as an 
attempt to make Chinese manufacturers good 
followers and secure profits.
The product life cycle is short in the electrical, 
electronics, and information and communications 
technology industr ies. The f irst mover can 
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establish its brand name in the market, and 
the latecomer faces an uphill battle. Under this 
principle, companies can buy the time to enjoy 
first-mover advantage by granting licenses to 
others, even though this act may appear at first 
glance to benefit the rivals.
7 Coping with outsiders
Sometimes, fol lowing prol i ferat ion of a 
technology, an enterprise or individual outside 
the international standardization activity for the 
given technology may file a patent infringement 
suit against the technology adopters to demand 
royalty payments. This situation is known as the 
“outsider problem.” The ultimate purpose of such 
outsiders is not to prohibit manufacture and sale 
of the applicable product. They are motivated by 
the economic benefit explained in “6 Incentives 
to License Patents.”
I t  wou ld  be  idea l  i f  a  s t a nda rd i z a t ion  
organization could identify all related patents in 
the standard development stage. However, this is 
virtually impossible because patents are managed 
separately on a country basis, and thus the 
outsider problem persists. What measures should 
be taken to address this issue?
The best  solut ion i s  involv ing as  many 
organizat ions as possible in internat ional 
standardization activities so that the number 
of patents left outside the framework can be 
minimized.
Attracting a significant number of participants 
in forums is not an easy task when dozens 
of forums are operated concurrently for the 
internat iona l standardizat ion of mutua l ly 
competing technologies. For market leaders, 
pol it ica l sk i l ls in resolving such complex 
situations and organizing many others are 
essential. When interviewed about the outsider 
problem, an MPEG standardization member 
answered that, if an outsider emerged, they 
would take the aggressive stance of discussing 
among members the possibility of diminishing 
the influence of the outsider's patent. They can 
act aggressively because many leaders in video 
coding technology take part in MPEG activities. 
If a standardization group has a majority of the 
related patents under its control, outsiders’ 
patents are undermined, and the group will hold 
the advantage in negotiating with outsiders.
It takes political competence for a company 
to organize a large forum. The company must 
be able to negotiate with world leaders in the 
industry, boldly adopt other forum members’
technologies outside its own core technology 
area, and even initiate prenegotiations with 
associated parties, e.g. winning endorsement 
from content providers in the case of DVD 
tech nolog y.  Even  a f te r  such  a  for u m i s  
successfully established, the company needs to 
maintain its involvement as the forum founder 
through such activities as convening meetings 
and serving as chair.
On the other hand, outsiders also have rights 
that are protected by the Patent Law, and their 
demands for royalties on reasonable grounds 
cannot be ignored. The JFTC’s guidelines refer to 
this point, stating: “refusal by a patent holder to 
grant a license generally does not pose a problem 
under the Anti-Monopoly Act if the patent holder 
is not involved in specification development 
activities.” When even refusal is not a problem, no 
one can stop outsiders from demanding licensing 
fees.
Outsiders usual ly do not manufacture or 
sell hardware and/or software incorporating 
their patented technologies; that is to say, their 
patents are not for self-exploitation. This is why 
they are hardly visible and emerge so abruptly. 
If the inventor does exploit patents for itself, it 
can benefit from both exploitation results and 
royalties. This is not the case with outsiders 
because they can benefit only from royalties, a 
fact that drives them to set higher royalty rates. 
In industry- academia joint research projects, 
participants from academia usually demand 
from business participants compensation for 
non-exploitation. In such projects, participating 
universities usually do not commercially utilize 
the resulting patents. If project members from 
industry exploit the result, academic members 
are more likely to seek payment of a kind of 
royalty known as non-exploitation compensation, 
although this notion is not applicable to joint 
research between private enterprises. Outsiders’ 
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demands for higher royalties are analogous to this 
practice and are not unreasonable.
Article 93 of the Japanese Patent Law refers to 
“a ruling on granting of non-exclusive licenses in 
the public interest.” Application of this article is 
mentioned in the report[10] released in November 
2004 by the Working Group on Patent Strategic 
Plan of the Industrial Structure Council (“Issues 
Concerning the Smooth Exploitation of Patented 
Inventions”). The report states that Article 93 
shall apply when such licensing is “particularly 
necessary in areas directly related to people’s 
lives, including the protection of human life and 
property and the construction of public facilities,” 
or when “the non-granting of a non-exclusive 
license for a given patented invention impedes 
sound overall development of the related industry 
and subsequently has seriously adverse effects 
on people’s lives.” It is unlikely that inability 
to adopt a standard poses a threat to people’s 
lives and safety in such sectors as electrical, 
electronics, and information and communications 
technologies. Therefore, no one can usurp the 
rights of outsiders.
8 Conclusions and proposals
This article has so far explained that the 
exploitation of patents as licenses is becoming 
more common in electrical, electronics, and 
information and communications technology 
industries. Since establishment of the Intellectual 
Property Policy Headquarters, Japan has been 
paying growing attention to standardization 
activities and patent pools as approaches to the 
effective utilization of intellectual property. This 
is the right direction for a country that aims to 
become an intellectual property-based nation. 
The next goal of the Japanese government is 
to intensify its efforts to exploit intellectual 
property with emphasis on the following two 
aspects:
(1) Underscoring patent exploitation
 through the Intellectual Property
 Strategic Program
While the Intel lectual Property Strategic 
Program is aimed at underl ining creation, 
protection and exploitation of intel lectual 
property, it does not mention exploitation as 
frequently as creation and protection. More 
emphasis should be placed on the significance of 
exploitation, including the aspects discussed in 
this article.
(2) Improving the patent system
When a standard is associated with numerous 
patents,  it s  advocates face tough hurdles 
that must be surmounted before they can 
have it widely adopted. For example, their 
standardization activity can be hindered by 
both the need to form a patent pool, for which 
the negotiation of an agreement among patent 
holders is usually a cumbersome process, and 
the emergence of outsiders. What makes these 
problems more complex is that each country has 
its own patent system, and examines and assesses 
patent applications in line with that system. An 
ideal solution from the viewpoint of promoting 
standardizat ion is to improve the current 
scheme toward unifying patent examination 
organizations worldwide and introducing more 
rigorous assessment criteria to prevent too-easy 
approval of patents. Although this should be 
treated as a long-term political goal, it is worth 
considering.
Ma ny  o t her  n a t ion a l  gover n ment s  a re  
increasing thei r emphasis on intel lectua l 
property. They should also be aware of the 
par t icu la r  impor tance of  exploit at ion of  
intellectual property.
Government efforts are meaningless without 
due response from the private sector. Companies 
should take the following measures:
(1) Strategically exploiting patents as licenses
For a company that owns powerful patents, 
licensing them to others rather than using them 
exclusively, may seem to conflict with its own 
interest; in fact, this approach has strategic 
value. Japanese companies should take a serious 
step toward leading the market through the 
exploitation of patents as licenses. Stepping up 
efforts to acquire more patents is a prerequisite to 
achieving this goal.
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(2) Taking advantage of international
 standardization activities as political
 negotiations
International standardization activities can 
be a negotiation tool, but simply participating 
in such activit ies is not enough. Japanese 
companies should move proactively to make 
more fr iends and par tners and have thei r 
patented and non - patented technolog ies  
incorporated in standards. The draft of the 
JFTC’s guidelines stated that it poses a problem 
if “some of the participants guide the content of 
the specifications in their favor (or against the 
interests of specific parties) by unfairly taking 
advantage of the specification development 
procedures.” However, the expression “in 
their favor” has been deleted as a result of 
public review, in response to a trade group’s 
comment pointing out that “it was natural for any 
participants in standardization activities to try to 
have their proprietary technologies adopted in 
the specifications.”
International standardization activities are 
pol itical negotiations, and not a forum for 
assessing which technologies excel over others. 
Therefore, companies should delegate skilled 
negotiators to participate in such activities. 
They should also provide their employees with 
educational opportunities to improve negotiation 
skills[11].
(3) Exploring the possibility of forming
 patent pools
Since the formation of a patent pool involves 
signi f icant coordination costs, companies 
should not place too great an expectation on 
this approach. However, if the participants in 
a standardization activity come to recognize 
a patent pool as a future option, coordination 
may become easier. Companies should initiate 
negotiations with others for the creation of a 
patent pool if their future visions require such a 
facility. 
Abbreviations
•ANSI  Amer ican National Standards 
Institute
•CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
•DVD Digital Versatile Disc
•IEC   International Electrotechnical 
Commission
•IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
•ISO   International Organization for 
Standardization
•ITU-T  International Telecommunication 
U n i o n  Te l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
Standardization Sector
•MPEG Moving Picture Experts Group
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